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Abstract
This paper presents rules of inference for a binary quantifier I for the
formalisation of sentences containing definite descriptions within intuitionist
positive free logic. I binds one variable and forms a formula from two
formulas. IxrF,Gs means ‘The F is G’. The system is shown to have desirable
proof-theoretic properties: it is proved that deductions in it can be brought
into normal form. The discussion is rounded up by comparisons between
the approach to the formalisation of definite descriptions recommended here
and the more usual approach that uses a term-forming operator ι, where
ιxF means ‘the F’.
Keywords: free logic, definite descriptions, proof theory, normalisation, intu-
itionist logic, binary quantifiers, term forming operators
1 Introduction
In two recent papers, I presented a binary quantifier for the formalisation of
definite descriptions, which was added to a system of natural deduction for an
intuitionist negative free logic.1 In the simplest case, I forms a formula from
two predicates, binding a variable. For example, if F is ‘x is present King of
France’ and G is ‘x is bald’, then IxrF,Gs means ‘The present King of France
is bald’. In the general case, formulas of any complexity may take the place
of F and G.2 I shall use F and G for any formulas where the formalisation of
definite descriptions is concerned. A and B are used for formulas in general.
Where this aids the discussion, the occurrence of a free variable in a formula is
indicated by enclosing it in brackets following the formula, as in Fpxq and Gpxq,
and replacement of variables by terms will be indicated analogously, as in Fptq
and Gptq. In official notation, Axt denotes the result of replacing the variable x
by the term t in the formula A. The syntax of I is that if F and G are formulas
1See (Kürbis, 2019a) and (Kürbis, 2019c). I shall divert from the previous presentation in two
respects. First, whereas previously I used ι for the binary quantifier, I now use I to make the
distinction between it and a term-forming operator for definite descriptions more perspicuous.
Secondly, the formalisation of quantificational logic uses parameters for free variables.
2To avoid vacuous quantification, we could require these to be formulas that contain the variable
x free. But this is not necessary.
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and x is a variable, then IxrF,Gs is a formula in which x is bound. Its intended
meaning is ‘The F is G’.
In negative free logic, the meaning of ‘The F is G’ is given by its Russellian
analysis ‘There is exactly one F and it is G’, and accordingly, IxrF,Gs is equivalent
to DxpF^ @ypFxy Ñ y “ xq ^ Gq. Definite descriptions are therefore eliminable.
For this reason many free logicians prefer positive over negative free logic. In
positive free logic, the Russellian analysis of ‘The F is G’ is rejected and only one
half of the equivalence holds: if there is exactly one F which is G, then the F
is G, but not conversely. Positive and negative free logicians agree, however,
that ‘The F exists’ is equivalent to ‘There is exactly one F’, and both have an
equivalent formalisation in Dy@xpF Ø x “ yq.
The present paper investigates which rules for the binary quantifier I are
suitable additions to a positive intuitionist free logic. In preparation for this
task the more common approach to formalising definite descriptions within
free logic is presented, which uses a term-forming operator ι: ι binds a variable
and forms a singular term out of a formula, where ιxF means ‘the F’. ‘The F
is G’ is formalised as GpιxFxq. Establishing some of the logical properties of
formulas of the form GpιxFq within intuitionist positive free logic presents a
vital step towards the formulation of rules for the binary quantifier I. Let me
say already here that, due to the characteristics of positive free logic, these rules
are significantly more complex than those for I in negative free logic.
The rules for I presented in the previous papers have desirable proof-theoretic
properties: a normalisation theorem showed that formula occurrences that are
the conclusions of an introduction rule and major premises of an elimination
rule for their main connective can be removed from deductions in the system of
intuitionist negative free logic with the binary quantifier I. Following Dummett
and Prawitz, the rules for I are in harmony and thus can count as specifying
its meaning. The present paper follows a similar path. The investigation is
proof-theoretical and a normalisation theorem is established for the system of
positive intuitionist free logic extended by rules for the binary quantifier I.3
Despite its proof-theoretic stance, occasionally the present paper touches
upon semantical considerations to illustrate and motivate the use of the binary
quantifier I. These remain at an intuitive level. The semantic intuition behind
adopting a positive free logic is that atomic sentences containing terms that do
not refer (to an object considered to exist or to be in the domain of quantification)
may nonetheless be true. This opposes the Russellian analysis according to
which they are all false. The failure of the Russellian equivalence of ‘The F is G’
and ‘There is exactly one F and it is G’ allows for the possibility that the F is G
even though the F does not exist. Thus according to positive free logic, it may
be true that John admires the world’s most famous detective even though the
world’s most famous detective, Sherlock Holmes, does not exist. Furthermore,
the law of self-identity holds unrestrictedly and not just for terms that refer, so
that ‘Sherlock Holmes is identical to Sherlock Holmes’ is logically true.
Formalising sentences containing definite descriptions with the binary
quantifier I has certain advantages over the more usual approach that employs
the forming operator ι. In the latter, ιxF denotes the only F, if there is one, or
3For the philosophical importance of the normalisation of deductions, see (Dummett, 1978),
(Dummett, 1993, Chs. 10-13), (Prawitz, 1987), (Prawitz, 2006). For a brief overview of the motivations
behind, challenges to and prospects for Dummett’s and Prawitz’s approach, see (Kürbis, 2015).
Normalisation for classical and intuitionist logic was first proved by Prawitz (Prawitz, 1965).
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else an object not considered to be amongst those that exist or nothing at all. A
question arises concerning the scope of unary operators, here only negation, but
in a modal setting also the modal operators: what does  GpιxFqmean? Does it
mean that the F is not G or that it is not the case that the F is G?
There is a sense in which no decision is called for. In negative free logic,
GpιxFq is true just in case there is a unique F and it is G. In positive free logic
GpιxFq is true just in case there is a unique F and it is G or the object assigned to
ιxF that is not considered to be amongst those that exist is G. Thus assuming
the principle of bivalence, as many prominent free logicians do, in negative
free logic,  GpιxFq is true just in case either there is no unique F or there is a
unique F and it is not G; in positive free logic,  GpιxFq is true if either there is a
unique F and it is not G or if there is no unique F and the ‘non-existent’ object
assigned to ιxF is not G. In the negative setting, there is a formula equivalent to
 GpιxFq in the language that does not contain ι and conveniently displays its
truth conditions; in the positive setting, there is no such formula, as there is no
other way of expressing that the ‘non-existent’ object assigned to ιxF is not G
than  GpιxFq. In either case,  GpιxFq has disjunctive truth conditions.
Although there is nothing wrong with disjunctive truth conditions – dis-
junctions, after all, have them and are on the whole well understood – as the
discussion shows we can evidently draw a distinction between the internal
negation ‘The F is not G’ and the external negation ‘It is not the case that the F is
G’ of ‘The F is G’ and a need to do so often arises. Hence it is desirable to have
the means to express the distinction in the formal language. For that purpose, it
is necessary to introduce markers for scope distinctions. Many authors, especially
those working with definite descriptions in modal logic, introduce an operator λ
for predicate abstraction for that purpose.4 The binary quantifier I, by contrast,
has scope distinctions built directly into the notation: the internal negation ‘The
F is not G’ is formalised as IxrF, Gs, the external negation ‘It is not the case that
the F is G’ as  IxrF,Gs. There is thus no need for separate syntactic means to
mark scope distinctions and using the binary quantifier to formalise definite
descriptions allows for a certain economy in the language.5
Section 6 of this paper contains a formal comparison of the present system
with a system using a term-forming operator ι for definite descriptions. But
first, the next section presents the system of intuitionist positive free logic used
in the present paper.6
4See (Lambert, 2001) for a treatment of definite descriptions and scope distinctions with an
abstraction operator in classical negative free logic, and (Fitting and Mendelsohn, 1998, Chs. 9ff) and
(Garson, 2013, Ch. 19) for the same in modal extensions of classical positive free logic. Lambert and
Bencivenga (1986) formalise a system of classical positive free logic with the λ abstraction operator,
but without definite descriptions. A different approach is followed by Gratzl, who employs Russell’s
method of marking the scope of a definite description by repeating it in square brackets (Gratzl,
2015).
5This is not to say that the binary quantifier only has advantages over the term-forming operator.
Although recommended by Dummett (Dummett, 1981, p.162), it is not recommended by Bostock
(Bostock, 1997, Sec. 8.4). It is fair to say that formulas with nested binary quantifiers can be difficult
to read, but such complications are unavoidable where scope distinctions are to be considered.
6It is the positive version of the system of intuitionist negative free logic of (Kürbis, 2019a), and
thus an intuitionist version of a standard system of classical positive free logic used by Lambert,
Bencivenga and others. Indrzejczak has shown how to formalise a variety of classical and intuitionist
negative and positive free logic in sequent calculi that allow for cut elimination (Indrzejczak, 2020c).
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2 Intuitionist Positive Free Logic
The language of the system IPF of intuitionist positive free logic is standard.
For simplicity I assume that there are no function symbols. The terms of the
language are constant symbols and parameters for free variables. t is used for
terms of either kind. Whenever the term-forming operator ι is concerned in
later sections, t also ranges over definite descriptions, unless otherwise stated.
Square brackets around top-most formulas in deductions indicate assumption
classes. Every formula occurrence in a deduction that is not regarded as an
axiom is in some assumption class, where formulas of different type are in
different classes, and those of the same type may or may not be in the same class.
Every assumption class receives a label. Discharge or closing of assumptions is
indicated by repeating the label at the inferences where the formula occurrences
in the assumption class are discharged. Empty assumption classes are allowed
and used in vacuous discharge. For convenience I will only display the
assumption classes of discharged assumptions in deductions given below, and
adopt the convention that undischarged assumptions of the same type belong
to the same assumption class.
The rules for the propositional connectives are:
A B
^I: A^ B
A^ B
^E: A
A^ B
B
rAsi
Π
B
Ñ I: iA Ñ B
A Ñ B A
Ñ E: B
A
_I: A_ B
B
A_ B
A_ B
rAsi
Π
C
rBs j
Σ
C
_E: i, jC
K
KE: B
where the conclusion B of KE is restricted to atomic formulas.
The rules for the quantifiers appeal to a primitive predicate D!, to be inter-
preted as ‘exists’ or ‘refers’:
rD!asi
Π
Axa
@I : i
@xA
@xA D!t
@E : Axt
where in @I, a does not occur in A nor in any undischarged assumptions of Π
except D!a.
Axt D!t
DI :
DxA
DxA
rAxas
i, rD!as j
looooomooooon
Π
C
DE : i, jC
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where in DE, a does not occur in A nor in C nor in any undischarged assumptions
of Π, except Axa and D!a.
Identity is governed by the Law of Self-Identity and Leibniz’ Law:
“ I: t “ t
t1 “ t2 Axt1
“ E: Axt2
where A is an atomic formula. The general case is proved by induction
over the complexity of formulas. Requiring t1 and t2 to be different excludes
vacuous applications of “ E. This is obviously no restriction and absolves us
from considering maximal formulas of the form t1 “ t2. In the unfortunate
circumstances where a transformation of a deduction results in a vacuous
application of “ E, it is assumed that it is removed as part of the transformation.
The characteristic difference between positive and negative free logic is that
the former lacks the rules of strictness, which allow the derivation of D!t from
atomic formulas containing t, and the latter requires the premise D!t in the
introduction rule for identity “ In. Intuitively, this means that in positive free
logic, atomic sentences may be true even if terms occurring in them do not refer,
while such sentences are always false in negative free logic; and in negative free
logic, self-identity is equivalent to existence, while in positive free logic, this is
not in general the case.
It will make sense to have primitive rules for the biconditionalØ:
rAsi
Π
B
rBs j
Π
A
Ø I : i, jA Ø B
A Ø B A
Ø E1 : B
A Ø B B
Ø E2 : A
Having these rules available simplifies some of the deductions in the comparison
of the binary quantifier and term-forming operator for definite descriptions.
It is customary in discussions of classical free logic to observe that it is
possible to dispense with the primitive D! and to treat it as defined in terms of D
and “, due to the following equivalence which holds also in IPF:
(˚1) $ D!t Ø Dy y “ t
If D!t, then by “ I and DI: Dy y “ t. If Dy y “ t, suppose a “ t and D!a, then by
“ E: D!t, and so by DE: D!t.
It is, however, formally convenient and philosophically preferable to keep D!
primitive. From the formal perspective of proving a normalisation theorem for
IPF, if D! is treated as defined, we should have to consider additional maximal
formulas of the form Dy y “ t arising when the premise D!t, i.e. Dy y “ t, of DI
or @E is derived by DI. From the philosophical perspective, and one that aims
at a proof-theoretic specification of the meanings of the logical constants, if D!
is treated as defined, then the meaning of the universal quantifier would be
specified in terms of the existential quantifier, that expression appearing in a
premise of its introduction rule and discharged hypothesis of its elimination
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rule, and the specification of the meaning of the existential quantifier would be
circular for precisely the same reason.
Wider philosophical considerations also support the view that D! should be
regarded as primitive. Logic is silent about the meanings of the atomic sentences
of the formal language and is not concerned with the question which of them
are, in fact, true and which are false. To treat D! as primitive is to treat formulas
of the form D!t as being in the same category as the other atomic formulas of the
language in this respect: the intended interpretation of D! is given outside logic.
Notice that the formal system does not decide whether D!t should mean ‘t exists’
or ‘”t” refers’. What exists and what doesn’t, which terms refer and which
don’t, is not in general a question of logic—although it may be in very special
cases, such as the numbers for logicists. Logic has no say in what grounds
the rather crucial difference between the names ‘Jamina’ and ‘Pegasus’. The
first refers, the second does not. Jamina is a pygmy hippopotamus that lives
in Łódź Zoo. Pegasus is a winged horse from Greek mythology. Jamina exists,
Pegasus does not. ‘D!Jamina’ is true in virtue of the animals that are kept in
Łódź Zoo and the names they have been given, and not because of some feature
of logic. The existence of Pegasus or the assumption that ‘Pegasus’ refers stands
in contradiction with what there is, and maybe even with what there can be
according to the laws of biology, and hence  D!Pegasus, but what it is that
precludes that Pegasus exists or that ‘Pegasus’ refers is again not a question of
logic.
These philosophical considerations also accord with the fact that the use
of D! in deductions in positive free logic is rather limited. No rule of IPF has
a formula of the form D!t as the conclusion. There is no introduction rule for
D!. Its main use is as an assumption, possibly one to be discharged. As a
corollary of the normalisation theorem for IPF it could be established rigorously
under which conditions a formula of the form D!t may be derived. This issue is
tangential to the main concerns of this paper, and so to do so here would go too
far. For the present discussion it suffices to point out that, aside from by being
an assumption, a subformula of one or a consequence of K, a formula of the
form D!t may be derived by Leibniz’ Law, in which case it has been derived from
a formula of the same form, but containing a different term, and an identity
with t to its left. Assumptions of the latter kind may be discharged by an
application of DE, as exemplified by the proof of the right to left direction of (˚1),
which presents the only other way a formula of the form D!t may be derived
from premises that are consistent and do not contain it as a subformula. Thus
formulas of the form D!t are only derivable if the premises are inconsistent, the
formula occurs as a subformula amongst them, or they contain D or identities,
the term t and the existential quantifier. Accordingly, in applications of the
system of positive free logic in the formalisation of a theory, for instance, or
of ordinary argumentation, typically a stock of formulas would be given that
specify what exists or which terms refer. The logic alone does not allow us to
derive a formula of the form D!t, but this requires assumptions which are of a
non-logical character. In the case of negative free logic, there are also the rules
of strictness that allow the derivation of formulas of the form D!t, but to do so,
assumptions or axioms need to be given that are atomic formulas, and their
truth is again not established by logic.
Consequently, a derivation of ‘The F is G’ requires information that is not of a
purely logical kind, be it that these are assumptions of a deduction or non-logical
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axioms of a theory. For instance, as will be seen from the introduction rule
governing I to be given in section 4, if we are to derive that the female pygmy
hippopotamus of Łódź Zoo is hungry, then we require assumptions such as
that Jamina is a female pygmy hippopotamus of Łódź Zoo, that she exists, that
she is hungry, and that she is the only female pygmy hippopotamus of Łódź
Zoo. Positive free logic also allows for the option that a sentence ‘The F is G’
is true even if there is no unique F, but then the logic does not specify any
conditions under which this may be the case: rather, this depends entirely on the
non-logical content of F and G. Such sentences can only be used as assumptions
or need to be added as non-logical axioms to theories. In this respect, however,
they are no different from axioms of theories such as that every number has a
unique successor (pace logicists) or assumptions such as that there is only one
female pygmy hippopotamus in Łódź Zoo.
The discussion of the previous paragraphs hints at a stronger conclusion:
the meaning of D! cannot be given by rules of inference, at least not by rules of a
purely logical character. This is neither surprising nor problematic. Existence
and reference concern domains outside logic, and there are other ways of giving
meanings to expressions than laying down rules of inference for them. Logic
can rely on those for the meaning of D!, just as it relies on them to provide the
meanings of ‘is a pygmy hippopotamus’ and ‘is a winged horse’. This may
be contentious amongst inferentialists, and as such point to a problem for the
acceptability of free logics with an existence predicate to some of them, but to
address these issues would require a paper on its own.7
3 The Term-Forming ι Operator in IPF
The binary quantifier I is intended to formalise the ordinary English ‘The F is
G’. In formalisations of definite descriptions by a term-forming operator ι, it
is customary to provide axioms only for occurrences of ι-terms to the left or
right of identity and to let the logical properties of formulas with occurrences of
ι-terms in other contexts be determined by them. As a preparation for finding
suitable rules of natural deduction governing the binary quantifier I, in this
section I will consider adding a term-forming operator ι for definite descriptions
to IPF and investigate the properties of the more general formulas of the form
GpιxFxq, where G need not be identity, in the resulting system.
The Russellian analysis of ‘The F is G’ as ‘There is a unique F and it is G’
is not suitable for the framework of positive free logic, where, semantically
speaking, atomic formulas may be true even though they contain terms that do
not refer (to an object considered to exist or to be in the domain of quantification).
GpιxFq is not logically equivalent to Dyp@xpF Ø x “ yq ^ Gq for every choice
of G. If there is a unique F and it is G, then the F is G, but the converse holds
only under the condition that there is a unique F. If Dy@xpF Ø x “ yq ^ GpιxFq,
then Dyp@xpF Ø x “ yq ^ Gq, and if Dyp@xpF Ø x “ yq ^ Gq, then GpιxFq. But
Dyp@xpF Ø x “ yq ^ Gq also implies Dy@xpF Ø x “ yq. So in positive free
7In negative free logic, D! is governed by what may look like introduction rules, namely the
rules of strictness. Even should we treat them as such, D! has no elimination rules, and so the rules
governing it fail to exhibit the format required of rules that determine meanings. Should we treat
the rules for the quantifiers and “ In as the elimination rules for D!, then the rules governing it are
not harmonious, and so again its meaning is not determined by them.
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logic, GpιxFq ^ Dy@xpF Ø x “ yq is equivalent to Dyp@xpF Ø x “ yq ^ Gq.
More briefly, exploiting the equivalence between ‘the F exists’ and ‘there is a
unique F’, which is retained in positive free logic, GpιxFq ^ D!ιxF is equivalent to
Dyp@xpF Ø x “ yq ^ Gq.
To establish the observations of the previous paragraph formally in IPF ex-
tended by the term-forming operator for definite descriptions, we add Lambert’s
Law as the sole axiom governing ι:
(LL) @ypιxF “ y Ø @xpF Ø x “ yqq
where x and y are distinct.
Call the resulting system IPFι.
It is generally agreed that Lambert’s Law axiomatises the minimal theory
of ι. Added to classical positive free logic, the resulting theory is often called
FD or MFD.8 I am here interested in formalising an equally minimal theory
of the binary quantifier I. As the chosen deductive apparatus of the present
paper is natural deduction, and the aim is to formulate rules with satisfactory
proof-theoretic properties, the logic is intuitionist. However, the rules for I to be
given in the next section could equally be added to classical positive free logic.9
It is easy to show that (LL) implies that there is a unique F if and only if the F
exists:
(˚2) $ D!ιxF Ø Dy@xpF Ø x “ yq
(a) By (LL) and @E: D!ιxF $ ιxF “ ιxF Ø @xpF Ø x “ ιxFq, so by “ I and Ø E:
D!ιxF $ @xpF Ø x “ ιxFqq, so by DI: D!ιxF $ Dy@xpF Ø x “ yq.
(b) Conversely, assume Dy@xpF Ø x “ yq, and suppose D!a and @xpF Ø x “ aq.
Then by (LL) and @E: ιxF “ a. So by DI: Dy ιxF “ y, and so by (˚1): D!ιxF.
Next, if the F exists and it is G, then there is a unique F that is G:
(˚3) D!ιxF,GpιxFq $ Dyp@xpF Ø x “ yq ^ Gpyqq
ιxF “ ιxF
pLLq D!ιxF
ιxF “ ιxF Ø @xpF Ø x “ ιxFq
@xpF Ø x “ ιxFq GpιxFq
@xpF Ø x “ ιxFq ^ GpιxFq D!ιxF
Dyp@xpF Ø x “ yq ^ Gpyqq
8See (van Fraassen and Lambert, 1967), (Bencivenga, 1986), (Lambert, 2001).
9Rules adequate for the binary quantifier I in a classical sequent calculus that allow cut
elimination are the subject of another paper. Indrzejczak provided cut-free sequent calculi for
various formalisations of the term-forming operator ι ((Indrzejczak, 2018a), (Indrzejczak, 2018b),
(Indrzejczak, 2020b)). Czermak formalised a further cut free system for a logic of definite descriptions
(Czermak, 1974). Tennant provides normalising rules for ι that are equivalent to Lambert’s Law in
intuitionist negative free logic (Tennant, 1978), (Tennant, 2004).
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(LL) implies that if there is a unique F that is G, then the F is G:
(˚4) Dyp@xpF Ø x “ yq ^ Gpyqq $ GpιxFq
Dyp@xpF Ø x “ yq ^ Gpyqq
pLLq rD!as1
ιxF “ a Ø @xpF Ø x “ aq
r@xpF Ø x “ aq ^ Gpaqs2
@xpF Ø x “ aq
ιxF “ a
r@xpF Ø x “ aq ^ Gpaqs2
Gpaq
GpιxFq
1,2
GpιxFq
Conversely, (LL) is derivable from (˚3) and (˚4). Let (˚3)’ and (˚4)’ be (˚3) and (˚4) with Gpyq replaced by ιxF “ y:
(˚5) (˚3)’, (˚4)’ $ (LL)
rιxF “ as2
rιxF “ as2 rD!as4
D!ιxF
p˚3q1
Dyp@xpF Ø x “ yq ^ y “ aq
r@xpF Ø x “ bq ^ b “ as1
@xpF Ø x “ aq
1
@xpF Ø x “ aq
r@xpF Ø x “ aqs4 a “ a
@xpF Ø x “ aq ^ a “ a rD!as4
Dyp@xpF Ø x “ yq ^ y “ aq
p˚4q1
ιxF “ a
2,3
ιxF “ a Ø @xpF Ø x “ aq
4
@ypιxF “ y Ø @xpF Ø x “ yqq
The double line stands for the derivable inference @xpF Ø x “ bq ^ b “ a $ @xpF Ø x “ aq, and the labels of (˚3)’ and (˚4)’ indicate their
use in the deduction.
It follows that the minimal theory of definite descriptions can be axiomatised equivalently by (˚3) and (˚4) instead of (LL). To formalise
suitable rules for the binary quantifier I, in the next section we will cast (˚3) and (˚4) into rules of a system of natural deduction.
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Russell and Whitehead observe that ambiguity arises from an attempted
definition of GpιxFq by Dyp@xpF Ø x “ yq ^ Gpyqq ‘when ιxF occurs in a
proposition which is part of a larger proposition’: then ‘there is doubt whether
the smaller or the larger proposition is to be taken as the GpιxFq.’ ((Whitehead and
Russell, 1997, 173), notation adjusted.) They note that the formula GpιxFq Ñ B,
B not containing the variable that ιxF replaces in G, can mean either of these:
Dyp@xpF Ø x “ yq ^ Gpyqq Ñ B
Dyp@xpF Ø x “ yq ^ pGpyq Ñ Bqq
Replacing B with K, the distinction is the one between internal and external
negation. If there is no unique F, then in negative free logic the first is true, but
the second is false. There is, therefore, a need to distinguish them. Russell and
Whitehead repeat the description in square brackets to mark scope distinctions:
rιxFsGpιxFq Ñ B
rιxFspGpιxFq Ñ Bq
In the first, the description has narrow scope, in the second it has wide scope.
In formalisations of theories of definite descriptions axiomatised by (LL),
GpιxFq is not defined as Dyp@xpF Ø x “ yq ^ Gpyqq. The logical properties of
GpιxFq are treated entirely in terms of consequences of (LL). As the latter makes
no provision for scope distinctions, neither does the theory as a whole.
These theories can be axiomatised equivalently by (˚3) and (˚4). (˚4) specifies
the conditions under which GpιxFqmay be inferred and (˚3) the consequences
that follow from it. Adopting an inferentialist theory of meaning, these determine
the meaning of GpιxFq. One may now ask what they tell us about  GpιxFq.
There are two paths to addressing this question. One is to contrapose (˚3) and
(˚4), the other to replace to replace G by G in them. Doing so with (˚3), keeping
D!ιxF in the antecedent in the contraposition, yields:
(˚6)  Dyp@xpF Ø x “ yq ^ Gpyqq, D!ιxF $  GpιxFq
(˚7)  GpιxFq, D!ιxF $ Dyp@xpF Ø x “ yq ^  Gpyqq
(˚6) and (˚7) give grounds and consequences of  GpιxFq under the assumption
that the F exists, in which case Russell’s internal and external negations are
equivalent. Contraposing and replacing in (˚4) give grounds and consequences
of  GpιxFq independently of this assumption:
(˚8) Dyp@xpF Ø x “ yq ^  Gpyq $  GpιxFq
(˚9)  GpιxFq $  Dyp@xpF Ø x “ yq ^ Gpyq
 GpιxFq thus lies between internal and external negation in logical strength,
implied by the former and implying the latter, but equivalent to neither. Thus in
a theory of definite descriptions axiomatised by (LL),  GpιxFq presents a third
option besides the two countenanced by Russell and Whitehead, and one might
even say that such a theory endorses the ambiguity they diagnose in  GpιxFq.
Russell and Whitehead have a point when they insist that it is possible
to draw scope distinctions in sentences containing definition descriptions, in
particular with respect to negation. The binary quantifier I provides a means of
formalising a theory of definite descriptions while building scope distinctions
directly into the notation.
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4 The Binary Quantifier I in IPF
Principle (˚4) occupies common ground between positive and negative free
logic, and so the introduction rule for the binary quantifier I of (Kürbis, 2019a)
is good for the present system, too:
Fxt G
x
t D!t
rFxas
i, rD!as j
looooomooooon
Π
a “ t
II : i, j
IxrF,Gs
where a is a fresh parameter, that is to say a is different from t, does not occur in
F or G, nor in any undischarged assumption in Π except Fxa and D!a.
The elimination rules for I of (Kürbis, 2019a) need to be adjusted. As IxrF,Gs
may be true even if no unique F exists, they require the additional premise
that the F exists, which in the present symbolism is expressed by IxrF, D!xs. The
following elimination rule for I captures (˚3):
IxrF,Gs IxrF, D!xs
rFxas
i, rGxas
j, rD!ask
loooooooooomoooooooooon
Π
C
IE1p1 : i, j,kC
where a is a fresh parameter, that is to say a does not occur in F, G or C, nor in
any undischarged assumptions of Π except Fxa , Gxa and D!a, and it is not free in F
or G.
Although straightforward and convenient for practical purposes, from the
proof-theoretic perspective this rule is unsatisfactory, as will be shown shortly.
A modified version fares better. This explains why its label carries a prime.
One of the more idiosyncratic features of definite descriptions in positive free
logic is that the uniqueness of the F is also only consequent upon its existence, and
so the second elimination rule for the binary quantifier of (Kürbis, 2019a) would
require the additional premise IxrF, D!xs, too. This addition, however, would
make the first premise redundant, and so in the present context we are left with:
IxrF, D!xs D!t1 D!t2 Fxt1 F
x
t2
IE2p1 : t1 “ t2
This rule, too, is going to be modified slightly, which explains the prime.
The problem with IE1p1 is that there is no general way of removing a formula
of the form IxrF, D!xs from a deduction that is concluded by II and the second
premise of IE1p1:
IxrF,Gs
Fxt D!t D!t
rFxzs
i, rD!zs j
looooomooooon
Π1
z “ t
i, j
IxrF, D!xs
rFxzs
k, rGxzs
l, rD!zsm
loooooooooomoooooooooon
Π2
C
k,l,m
C
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This may not be a dramatic shortcoming: in intuitionist negative free logic,
we cannot expect to be able to remove formulas of the form D!t that have been
concluded by rules of strictness and are used as the existence premises of “ In,
DI or @E. We have a similar situation here, and so it would make sense not to
consider IE1p1 as an elimination rule for IxrF, D!xs, and not to count formulas that
are concluded by II and used as the second premise of IE1p1 as maximal.
Contrary to the situation in intuitionist negative free logic, however, it is
possible to do better in IPF. IE1p1 can be reformulated in such a way that the
offensive formulas IxrF, D!xsmay be removed from deductions. This comes at
a cost in the complexity of the rules, so for the practical purpose of carrying
out deductions it is often useful to keep the simpler rule in mind and apply it
instead. The desired modification is achieved by replacing the premise IxrF, D!xs
of IE1p1 by the conditions under which it may be derived as specified by II:
IxrF,Gs Fxt D!t
rFxas
i1 , rD!asi2
loooooomoooooon
Π
a “ t
rFxbs
i3 , rGxbs
i4 , rD!bsi5
looooooooooomooooooooooon
Σ
C
IE1p : i1...i5C
where a and b are fresh: a is different from t, does not occur in F or G, nor in any
undischarged assumptions of Π except Fxa and D!a; and b does not occur in F, G,
C, nor in any undischarged assumptions of Σ except Fxb , G
x
b and D!b.
Replacing IE1p1 by IE1p requires the addition of a further elimination rule for
formulas of the form IxrF, D!xs:
IxrF, D!xs
rFxas
i, rD!as j
looooomooooon
Π
C
IE3p : i, jC
where a is fresh: it does not occur in F or C nor in any undischarged assumptions
of Π except Fxa and D!a.
This is because IE1p makes stronger demands on the conditions under which it is
applicable than IE1p1: it requires the conditions under which the second premise
of the latter may be derived, rather than just its assumption. IE1p1 may therefore
be applied under conditions where IE1p is not applicable, namely when IxrF, D!xs
is assumed rather than deduced. IE3p restores the balance: it is effectively the
special case of IE1p1 where G is D!.10
10It may be objected that in determining the elimination rules for I, I have not followed any of
the methods for ‘reading off’ elimination rules from introduction rules that may be found in the
literature (see, e.g., (Prawitz, 1979), (Schroeder-Heister, 1984), (Kürbis, 2007), (Francez and Dyckhoff,
2012), Read (2010), Kürbis (2019b)). I have instead looked for proof-theoretically satisfactory rules
of inference by transposing axioms equivalent to a prominent theory of definite descriptions into
rules of natural deduction with an eye on proving a normalisation theorem. A discussion whether
this disqualifies the present approach in the eyes of some inferentialists is a broader question and
goes beyond the scope of this paper. A decision must be be left to the reader.
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IE1p1 and the pair IE1p and IE3p are interderivable, given II and IE2p1:
(a) IE3p is the special case of IE1p1 where both premises are IxrF, D!xs, but listed only once. Given Fxt , D!t and a deduction Π of a “ t from F
x
a
and D!a, by II derive IxrF, D!xs, using D!t twice to make up the required number of premises, and so by IE1p1, now using IxrF, D!xs twice,
derive C.
(b) Given IxrF,Gs, IxrF, D!xs and a deduction Π of C from Fxa , Gxa and D!a, apply IE2p
1 to IxrF, D!xs and assumptions Fxb , F
x
c , D!b and D!c, where
b, c are fresh and different, to derive b “ c; using Fxc and D!c once more as premises, apply IE1p to derive C; apply IE3p to discharge
assumptions Fxc and D!c. See the construction below:
IxrF, D!xs
IxrF,Gs rFxc sk rD!cs j
IxrF, D!xs rD!bsi1 rD!cs j rFxbs
i2 rFxc sk
IE2p1
b “ c
rFxas
i3 , rGxas
i4 , rD!asi5
looooooooooomooooooooooon
Π
C
i1...i5 IE1pC
j,k IE3p
C
Thus II, IE1p, IE2p1 and IE3p capture (˚3) and (˚4), just as well as do II and IE1p1. But we’re not quite there yet.
As shown by (˚1), identity sometimes carries some of the characteristics of existence, and we need additional rules to ensure this. They
are more or less IE2p1 and IE3p with D! replaced by an identity:
IxrF, x “ t2s D!t1 D!t2 Fxt1
IE4p1 : t1 “ t2
IxrF, x “ ts D!t
rFxas
i, rD!as j
looooomooooon
Π
C
IE5p : i, jC
Notice the missing premise Fxt2 in IE
4p1 and the additional premise D!t in IE5p. Like IE2p1, IE4p1 will be slightly modified, hence the prime. To
this issue, we turn next.
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It is possible to avoid occurrences of identities that are concluded by IE2p1
and used as the major premise in Leibniz’s Law by replacing the former rule
with a slight reformulation that absorbs a step by the latter:
IxrF, D!xs D!t1 D!t2 Fxt1 F
x
t2 A
x
t1
IE2p : Axt2
where A is an atomic formula.
An induction over the complexity of formulas shows that IE2p is derivable for
formulas A of any degree. IE2p1 and IE2p are interderivable in virtue of the rules
for identity. To derive IE2p1 from IE2p, let Axt1 be t1 “ t1; for the converse, apply
Leibniz’s Law to the conclusion of IE2p1.
Finally, we do the same with IE4p1:
IxrF, x “ t2s D!t1 D!t2 Fxt1 A
x
t1
IE4p : Axt2
where A is an atomic formula.
An argument similar to the one given in the previous case shows that IE4p and
IE4p1 are interderivable and an induction that the rules is derivable for formulas
A of any degree.
For practical purposes IE2p1 and IE4p1 are more convenient than IE2p and
IE4p, but for proof-theoretic purposes the latter are more interesting. So let
IPFI be IPF extended by the binary quantifier I governed by the rules II,
IE1p, IE2p, IE3p, IE4p, IE5p. In the next section we will prove a normalisation
theorem for this system.
To close this section, it may not come amiss to illustrate the use of I with a
few examples. For simplicity, throughout I’ll use IE2p1 and IE4p1 instead of IE2p
and IE4p. Applications of the unfamiliar rules for I will be marked explicitly, for
easier readability. The deductions also show that IPFI provides an adequate
reconstruction of a minimal theory of definite descriptions within positive free
logic. The examples correspond to characteristic theses of a minimal theory of
definite descriptions formalised with a term-forming operator and axiomatised
by (LL). The correspondence between IPFI and IPFι is of course not perfect, as
the latter system does not have scope distinctions. A closer comparison of the
two systems is the subject of section 6.
(˚10) DxpF^ @ypFxy Ñ y “ xq ^ Gq $ IxrF,Gs
See (Kürbis, 2019a, 91): the deduction given there only appeals to the introduction
rule for the binary quantifier, so remains correct in IPFI.
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(˚11) IxrF,Gs, IxrF, D!xs $ DxpF^ @ypFxy Ñ y “ xq ^ Gq
IxrF, D!xs
IxrF,Gs rFxds
8 rD!ds9
IxrF, D!xs rD!cs3 rD!ds9 rFxc s4 rFxds
8
IE2p1
c “ d
rFxbs
5
IxrF, D!xs rD!as2 rD!bs6 rFxas1 rFxbs
5
IE2p1
a “ b
1
Fxa Ñ a “ b
2
@ypFxy Ñ y “ bq rGxbs
7
@ypFxy Ñ y “ bq ^ Gxb
Fxb ^ @ypF
x
y Ñ y “ bq ^ Gxb
DxpF^ @ypFxy Ñ y “ bq ^ Gq
3,4,5,6,7 IE1p
DxpF^ @ypFxy Ñ y “ bq ^ Gq
8,9 IE3p
DxpF^ @ypFxy Ñ y “ bq ^ Gq
(˚12) IxrF, D!xs $ Dy@xpF Ø x “ yq
IxrF, D!xs
IxrF, D!xs rD!as3 rD!bs4 rFxas1 rFxbs
5
IE2p1
a “ b
rFxbs
5 ra “ bs2
Fxa 1,2
Fxa Ø a “ b
3
@xpF Ø x “ bq rD!bs4
Dy@xpF Ø x “ yq
4,5 IE3p
Dy@xpF Ø x “ yq
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(˚13) Dy@xpF Ø x “ yq $ IxrF, D!xs
Dy@xpF Ø x “ yq
r@xpF Ø x “ aqs3 rD!as4
Fxa Ø a “ a a “ a
Fxa rD!as4 rD!as4
r@xpF Ø x “ aqs3 rD!bs1
Fxb Ø b “ a rF
x
bs
2
b “ a
1,2 II
IxrF, D!xs
3,4
IxrF, D!xs
(˚14) $ IxrF, D!xs Ø Dy@xpF Ø x “ yq
From (˚12) and (˚13) byØ I.
(˚15) IxrF, D!xs $ DyIxrF, x “ ys
IxrF, D!xs
rD!as4
rFxas3 a “ a rD!as4
IxrF, D!xs rD!bs1 rD!as4 rFxbs
2 rFxas3
IE2p1
b “ a
1,2 II
IxrF, x “ a]
DyIxrF, x “ y]
3,4 IE3p
DyIxrF, x “ y]
(˚16) DyIxrF, x “ ys $ IxrF, D!xs
DyIxrF, x “ ys
rIxrF, x “ ass5 rD!as6
rFxas3 rD!as4 rD!as4
rIxrF, x “ ass5 rD!bs2 rD!as4 rFxbs
1
IE4p1
b “ a
1,2 II
IxrF, D!xs
3,4 IE5p
IxrF, D!xs
5,6
IxrF, D!xs
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(˚17) $ DyIxrF, x “ ys Ø IxrF, D!xs
From (˚15) and (˚16) byØ I.
(˚17) corresponds to the special case of (˚1) in a system with a term-forming ι operator where t is a definite description.
(˚18) IxrF, x “ as, D!a $ IxrF, D!xs
By omitting the final application of DE in the proof of (˚16).
(˚18) corresponds to the application of Leibniz’s Law in the derivation of (˚5). Thus a formula corresponding to (LL) is derivable in IPFI by
adapting the proof of (˚5).
The following two propositions correspond to @E and DI when t is a definite description:
(˚19) @xG, IxrF, D!xs $ IxrF,Gs
See (Kürbis, 2019c, 315): the proof is exactly as the one given there.
(˚20) IxrF,Gs, IxrF, D!xs $ DxG
IxrF, D!xs
IxrF,Gs rFxbs
5 rD!bs6
IxrF, D!xs rD!as1 rD!bs6 rFxas2 rFxbs
5
IE2p1
a “ b
rGxc s3 rD!cs4
DxG
1,2,3,4 IE1p
DxG
5,6 IE3p
DxG
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5 Normalisation for IPFI
The major premise of an elimination rule is the premise that contains the connective
it governs in the general statement of the rule: they way elimination rules are
written here, it is always their leftmost premise.11
Definition 1 (Maximal Formula) A maximal formula is an occurrence of a for-
mula in a deduction that is the conclusion of an introduction rule and major
premise of an elimination rule.
Call the rules _E, DE, IE1p, IE3p and IE5p del-rules.
Definition 2 (Segment, Length and Degree of a Segment, Maximal Segment)
(a) A segment is a sequence of two or more formula occurrences C1 . . .Cn in a
deduction such that C1 is not the conclusion of a del-rule, Cn is not the minor
premise of a del-rule, and for every i ă n, Ci is minor premise of a del-rule and
Ci`1 its conclusion.
(b) The length of a segment is the number of formula occurrences of which it
consists, its degree is their degree.
(c) A segment is maximal if and only if its last formula is the major premise of an
elimination rule.
Definition 3 (Normal Form) A deduction is in normal form if and only if it
contains neither maximal formulas nor maximal segments.
Detour conversions are methods for removing maximal formulas from deductions.
Permutation conversions decrease the length of maximal segments by permuting
the application of the elimination rule to its last formula upwards. If its first
formula was derived by an introduction rule, the procedure turns the maximal
segment into a maximal formula. I refer to both kinds of conversions collectively
as reduction steps.
Definition 4 (Rank of a Deduction) The rank of a deduction Π is the pair xd, ly
where d is the highest degree of any maximal formula or segment in Π, and l is
the sum of the number of maximal formulas plus the sum of the lengths of all
maximal segments in Π. If there are no maximal formulas or segments in Π, let
its rank be x0, 0y.
Ranks are ordered lexicographically: xd, ly ă xd1, l1y iff either d ă d1 or d “ d1
and l ă l1.
Reduction steps for the connectives of IPF are straightforward by adapting
those given by Prawitz (Prawitz, 1965). We state without giving the details:
Theorem 1 Any deduction in IPF can be brought into normal form.
Proof by induction over the rank of deductions in IPF: applying a reduction step
to a suitably chosen maximal formula or maximal segment of highest degree
reduces the rank of a deduction.
11The terminology in this section follows (Troestra and Schwichtenberg, 2000).
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To prove that deductions in IPFI normalise, we need to add detour conversions to remove maximals formulas of the form IxrF,Gs, where in
case the maximal formula is eliminated by IE1p, G can be any formula, while if it is eliminated by IE2p or IE3p it is D!x, and if it is eliminated
by IE4p or IE5p it is x “ t. I will only give detour conversions, the permutation conversions being standard.
Detour Conversions for the Binary Quantifier I
In each case, the conditions on parameters and the fact that every deduction can be transformed into one in which each parameter is the
parameter of exactly one application of a rule for a quantifier ensure that the deduction remains correct after the conversion.
1. The maximal formula is major premise of IE1p. Replace the deduction to the left of{with the one on its right:
Π1
Fxt1
Π2
Gxt1
Π3
D!t1
rFxas
i, rD!as j
looooomooooon
Π4
a “ t1
i, j
IxrF,Gs
Σ1
Fxt2
Σ2
D!t2
rFxbs
k1 , rD!bsk2
loooooomoooooon
Σ3
a “ t2
rFxc s
k3 , rGxc s
k4 , rD!csk5
looooooooooomooooooooooon
Ξ
C
k1...k5C
{
rFxt1s
Π1
, rGxt1s
Π2
, rD!t1s
Π3
looooooooomooooooooon
Ξct1
C
2. The maximal formula is major premise of IE2p. Replace the deduction to the left of{with the one on its right, where the double line
indicates the steps needed to derive the symmetry of identity:
Π1
Fxt1
Π2
Gxt1
Π3
D!t1
rFxas
i, rD!as j
looooomooooon
Ξ
a “ t1
i, j
IxrF, D!xs D!t2
Σ1
D!t3
Σ2
Fxt2
Σ3
Fxt3
Σ4 Σ5
Axt2
Axt3
{
rFxt3s
Σ4
, rD!t3s
Σ2
looooomooooon
Ξat3
t3 “ t1
t1 “ t3
rFxt2s
Σ3
, rD!t2s
Σ1
looooomooooon
Ξat2
t2 “ t1
t2 “ t3
Σ5
Axt2
Axt3
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This last reduction step is quite interesting. It is unusual for reduction steps to require applications of rules of inference for a different
connective, in this case the rules for identity. As identity occurs in II, this is what we should expect. If normalisation was possible without
applying the rules for identity, it would appear that the rules governing I are in harmony independently of identity, so that there should be
rules governing I that do not appeal to it. But this is impossible in the present framework, as we cannot express uniqueness without using
identity.
3. The maximal formula is major premise of IE3p. Replace the deduction to the left of{with the one on its right:
Π1
Fxt
Π2
D!t
Π3
D!t
rFxas
i, rD!as j
looooomooooon
Π4
a “ t
i, j
IxrF, D!xs
rFxbs
k, rD!bsl
looooomooooon
Ξ
C
k,l
C
{
rFxt s
Π1
, rD!ts
Π2
loooomoooon
Ξbt
C
Alternatively, we could replace t by b in Π1 and Π2 or Π3, thereby concluding Fxb and D!b, using them to conclude the respective open
assumptions of Ξ, and continue on to conclude C.
4. The maximal formula is major premise of IE4p. Replace the deduction to the left of{with the one on its right, where the double line
indicates the steps needed to derive the symmetry of identity:
Π1
Fxt1
Π2
t1 “ t2
Π3
D!t1
rFxas
i, rD!as j
looooomooooon
Ξ
a “ t1
i, j
IxrF, x “ t2s
Σ1
D!t3
Σ2
D!t2
Σ3
Fxt3
Σ4
Axt2
Axt3
{
Π2
t1 “ t2
rFxt3s
Σ3
, rD!t3s
Σ1
looooomooooon
Ξat3
t3 “ t1
t3 “ t2
t2 “ t3
Σ4
Axt2
Axt3
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In this reduction step, too, appeal is made to the rules for identity: as before, this is not surprising, this time because an identity is a
subformula of the maximal formula to be removed.
5. The maximal formula is major premise of IE5p. Replace the deduction to the left of{with the one on its right, where the double line
indicates the steps needed to derive the symmetry of identity:
Π1
Fxt1
Π2
t1 “ t2
Π3
D!t1
rFxas
i, rD!as j
looooomooooon
Π4
a “ t1
i, j
IxrF, x “ t2s
Σ
Dt2
rFxbs
k, rD!bsl
looooomooooon
Ξ
C
k,l
C
{
Fxt1
Π1
, D!t1
Π3
looomooon
Ξxt1
C
This completes the detour conversions for maximal formulas of the form IxrF,Gs, and we are ready to prove:
Theorem 2 Any deduction in IPFI can be brought into normal form.
Proof by induction over the rank for deductions. Applying a reduction step to a maximal formula or maximal segment of highest degree
such that no such segments stand above it reduces the rank of the deduction.
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6 The Binary Quantifier I and the Term-Forming ι
Operator in IPF
For reasons sufficiently indicated in the previous sections, as IPFι lacks a means
for drawing scope distinctions, I will not compare the full systems IPFI and
IPFι. There is, for instance, no direct, straightforward translation from one to
the other. Instead, I impose two restrictions on both systems and compare the
results: (1) the G in IxrF,Gs is either D! or “, and correspondingly, ι-terms occur
only after D! or to the left or right of identity (and not both); (2) Leibniz’s Law is
restricted to constants and parameters. (1) excludes formulas such as  GpιxFq,
where questions of scope arise, and absolves us from considering nested binary
quantifiers. It also permits us to regard IxrA, D!xs and D!ιxA and IxrA, x “ ts
and ιxA “ t as notational variants, as was done in a previous paper (Kürbis,
2019c, Sec 4). (2) is justified with an eye to extending IPFI by modal operators,
in which case restrictions of Leibniz’ Law are mandatory if non-rigid terms are
considered.12
There is one respect in which (1) does not present much of a restriction of
IPFι at all. In IPFι the logical force of formulas of the form GpιxFq is determined
entirely by that of formulas of the form Gt and t “ ιxF: GpιxFq cannot be used
in a deduction unless there is also a formula t “ ιxF, for some term t. The
consequences of GpιxFq and the conditions under which it may be inferred are
then specified by (LL) and Leibniz’s Law. Thus instead of considering GpιxFq,
we may consider Gptq ^ t “ ιxF, for some term t, instead. In other respects (1)
and (2) of course present significant restrictions.
Let IPFIR and IPFιR be IPFI and IPFι with the respective versions of restrictions
(1) and (2) imposed. We will show them to be equivalent.
(˚5) derives (LL) from instances of (˚3) and (˚4) respecting restriction (1).
(˚10) and (˚11) derive the notational variants of (˚3) and (˚4) in IPFI, and
hence the required instances hold in IPFIR. (˚18) is the instance of Leibniz’s
Law corresponding to the one application of it to an ι term in (˚5). Any other
application of Leibniz’s Law in these deductions respects restriction (2). Thus
changing notation and replacing formulas of the form ιxF “ t in (˚5) to their
notational variant IxrF, x “ ts, it follows that (LL) is derivable in IPFIR. Thus
IPFιR is a subsystem of IPFIR. It is worth checking that all six rules for the binary
quantifier are used in the deductions.
To show the converse, it suffices to observe that the notational variants of
II, IE1p1, ιE2p1, IE4p1 and IE5p in IPFιR are straightforward consequences of (LL).
IPFIR is thus a subsystem of IPFιR, and so we have:
Theorem 3 IPFIR and IPFιR are equivalent.
12An even stricter approach is followed by Fitting and Mendelsohn, who only allow variables to
occur to the left and right of identity (Fitting and Mendelsohn, 1998, Ch 7); in fact, the atomic formulas
of their system are formed only from predicate letters and variables (Fitting and Mendelsohn, 1998,
81). To form a formula with a name, function symbol or definite description requires a predicate
formed by predicate abstraction (Fitting and Mendelsohn, 1998, 196f, 248f). Variables are interpreted
rigidly, all other terms may be rigid or non-rigid. Leibniz’ Law holds unrestrictedly only for
variables.
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7 Conclusion
The binary quantifier I allows for the formalisation of sentences containing
definite descriptions while respecting intuitive distinctions of scope without the
need for introducing an additional syntactic means for representing them in the
formal system. Its rules have desirable proof-theoretic properties: deductions
in IPFI normalise. A subsystem of IPFI was shown to be equivalent to a
system formalising the minimal theory of a term forming ι operator for definite
descriptions within intuitionist positive free logic. This represents the more
common approach to the formalisation of definite descriptions.
Comparing IPFI to a system that extends IPFι by a device such as a λ operator
for predicate abstraction to mark scope must be left to another occasion. Classical
systems of this kind found in the literature on free logic are not suitable to the
present concerns. The system of (Lambert, 2001) is designed for negative free
logic, while predicate abstraction formalised in Lambert and Bencivenga (1986)
carries existential import. Thus an expression of the form λxGpιxFq of the latter
system extended by the ι operator does not correspond to IxrF,Gs, which does
not carry existential import.
More suitable systems may be found in the context of modal logic, such
as those of (Fitting and Mendelsohn, 1998, Ch 9ff) and (Garson, 2013, Ch 19).
Indrzejczak has provided cut free sequent calculi for the former (Indrzejczak,
2018a) as well as the latter (Indrzejczak, 2020a). These results inspire confidence
that similarly proof-theoretically satisfactory systems may be provided for
modal logics extended by the binary quantifier I. An extension of IPFI by modal
operators and a comparison of the result with these systems will be the focus of
future investigations.
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